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My main goal in these pages is to contribute to the knowledge of the
constitution of a significant part of the new "political class" in democratic Spain,
the members of Parliament, as well as some of their characteristics. I analyze the
dimension of renewal and permanency of the Spanish members of Parliament. The
period under study goes from the constitution of the Constituent Parliament
resulting from the first democratic elections that took place on June the 15th 1977,
to the last General Elections of June the 6th 1993.
I will try to prove throughout the following pages that the study of the 
renewal of what may be called the "parliamentary class" allows us a deeper 
comprehension of two relevant fields of work for the understanding of the political 
transition process and democratic consolidation in Spain. First, it allows us to 
progress in the study of the building up of the new democratic "political class". 
Twenty years have passed since Franco's death, and eighteen since the first 
democratic elections, and we are still lacking a systematic study of the 
characteristics, extraction and, above all, the patterns of renewal and change of 
the political personnel in Spain.1<A HREF="#FT1">(1)</A><A NAME="TX1"> 
</A>Second, my interest in this subject is closely linked to my dedication in these 
past few years to the study of the Spaniard's political culture built up in the same 
period of time. The emergence, since the beginning of the transition, of feelings, 
values and attitudes towards the new political system, has aroused the interest of 
a wide number of sociologists and political scientists, resulting in a large number 
of works being published on the subject (Maravall 1982; Montero and Torcal 1990; 
Morán 1988; Morán and Benedicto 1995).2 Studies of the culture or of the 
discourse of the political elite are, though, practically non-existent. The 
examination of the renewal and
permanency of Spanish MPs can be placed, then, within a wider interest in
understanding changes in the members of this institution's own cultures, and their
relation to the different political parties' cultures and political discourse.
All this justifies this work's link to some "classical" studies on 
parliamentary elites. In so many words, I cannot but refer to works by Sartori 
(1963), Cotta, (1979) and Herzog (1971), all of them a direct reference in my 
exposition, as they enter into the study of the Italian and German cases, both 
marked by the interruption of parliamentary democracy and, thus, by the 
democratic political system's reconstruction. Despite being published a long time 
ago, their hypotheses are still applicable to the analysis of the Spanish case. On 
the other hand, the interest aroused by this field of research has been recently 
undertaken by Von Beyme (1995), thus proceeding with a line of investigation that 
he has been undertaking for a long time.3
 Justifying the choice of the parliamentary class as an object of study 
relevant to examining the construction of the political class in the transition and 
consolidation of democracy raises a problem. It is necessary to locate the 
Parliament inside the advanced societies' democratic systems that, inevitably, 
leads to questioning its centrality inside the political system, and to discussions 
regarding the appearance of new and more relevant actors and institutions in the 
political decision making process.4 Although it is hard to deny the existence of a 
certain "crisis" in parliamentary institution, it still fulfills at least two main 
functions that allow us to keep defending the importance of the 
"parliamentary class" as an essential component
of the political class as a whole (Cotta 1976).
In the first place, the Parliament still plays its role as a balancing and
regulating structure of the democratic system's competitive dynamic. And,
secondly, it is within the Parliament where the processes of balancing and
regulation of the party system take place. Thus, the main point of reference is the
parliamentarization of the different party organizations inside the political
system; that is to say, the moment in which the parliamentary organization turns
into the fundamental mechanism for the regulation of the democratic dynamic.
Classical studies of Parliaments have focussed mainly on two subjects. On 
one hand, they have considered the representativity of the MPs with respect to the 
citizenship that has elected them and, on the other, have emphasized the 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of their internal composition. This second dimension 
refers directly to the problems of the politicians' professionalization, and to the 
shaping of the political class.5 It is inside this second level where this exposition is 
situated, trying to establish the bond between the democratization of the 
Spanish political system and the parliamentary personnel's features.
Consideration of the parliamentary elite's renewal allows us to bring in
some interesting considerations regarding the above mentioned bond, as well as on
the role played by political parties in such a process. In a classic study, Polsby
(1968), applying Huntington's (1968) thesis on the institutionalization of political
systems, established some lines of work that serve as a guide for this exposition.
Inside the general process of the political system's institutionalization, the
Parliament's institutionalization has two different meanings. For one, there is an
external or systemic-functional meaning, by which the Parliament confirms itself
as an institution holding the central position in the political system. But, on the
other side, there is also an internal or structural meaning that regards the concept
of institutionalization as a structural process in which the Parliament arises as a
complex and autonomous institution that is self-regulating and self-sufficient.
On the basis of this second meaning, it is possible to create a series of
indicators that allow for the substantiation of the degree of institutionalization of
Parliaments (Polsby 1968; Cotta 1976 and 1979). The hypothesis that lies at the
bottom of this operationalization is that of the existence of an optimal point
between an excessively open and discontinous parliament and an exessively closed
and continuous parliament. Thus, the degree of the parliament's
institutionalization becomes an extremely relevant indicator for evaluating the
degree of creation of common authority patterns, the origin of a consensus of
purposes inside the Chamber and, finally, the creation of the MPs' own
institutional culture. The three main indicators of such an institutional process
are the following:
(a)  The institution's autonomy ("boundary definition") in relation to the
adjacent political structures; that is to say, the evaluation of the ability of the
Chamber to regulate its own development. This is defined by the renewal rates
and the kind of recruiting of the parliamentary personnel.
(b) The insitutional complexity, translated into the development of a system
of Commissions, in the emergence of a partisan parliamentary leadership and,
finally, in an increase in the Chamber's resources.
(c)  The institutional coherence, that is to say, the affirming of universal
rules and of automatic procedures for the resolution of organizational issues.
As stated at the beginning, this exposition will center itself in the
examination of the first of these indicators for the Spanish case.
The Particularities of the Spanish Case
Apart from the theoretical considerations stated above, for the Spanish case 
there are some additional reasons that make consideration of the way in which the 
new political-parliamentary class is built especially relevant. It seems that the 
transition's own nature has given a key role to the process of negotiation and pact 
between a segment of the Francoist political elite and the counter-elite associated 
with the main parties in opposition.6 In this setting of the search for a 
commitment, the political parties succeed in almost completely monopolizing 
Spanish political life. In the political parties' constitutionalization and in their 
financing system we can find good proof of this. Thus, it is impossible to 
separate the history of the constitution of the political class from the 
history of the vicissitudes of the party system.7
 Nevertheless, before entering into the analysis of the Spanish case, I would like 
to comment on the characteristics of this work. Studies of elites are always 
rather ungratifying for the researcher as they mean an enormous effort of 
gathering information, that does not usually show through in the final result. In 
the Spanish case, in what is referred to as the political elite, these difficulties are 
greatly increased. Political parties have always been very reluctant to provide 
information on aspects affecting their internal organization, making 
organizational studies very rare up to this moment. Regarding the Cortes, 
information on MPs is not very abundant and, mostly, it is not very homogeneous, 
apart from being limited to strictly demographical data (age, place of birth,
political party, legislative terms, etc.).8 Thus, it is very difficult, if 
not nearly impossible, to reach definite conclusions on the political "careers" of 
Spanish members of Parliament.
Leaving aside such obstacles, there are some features characteristic of the 
Spanish case to be considered before proceeding to a definitive analysis of this 
study's results.  Above all, it must be pointed out that the long duration of the 
Francoist regime had,  as a consequence,  the almost complete discontinuity  with 
the previous democratic-parliamentary tradition. In contrast with what happened 
in the German and Italian cases (Herzog 1971; Cotta 1979; Von Beyme 1995), 
there are no parliamentary careers beginning in the II Republic that continue 
after the democratic system's restoration.9 The Spanish transition was 
established on the grounds of a "pact of silence", and the oblivion of both the 
civil war and four decades of Francoism, an agreement subscribed by both the 
political forces that represented a continuity of Francoism and those that had 
their origins in the opposition forces. Nevertheless, this collective effort aimed 
at erasing a significant part of the Spaniard's collective memory does not 
mean, in any way, that it did not play an important role in establishing the new 
democracy. In fact, this pact of silence is combined with the persistence of the 
memory of the civil war. This memory has a relevant weight in shaping the 
Spaniards' political universes as well as the political elites' strategies.10 
This complex interplay between the persistence of memory and the need to 
forget has, as a consequence,  the fact that the construction of the new political 
organizations meant, in every case, breaking with the old ruling elites in those
parties with a history of their own, previous to Francoism, and the gradual 
disappearance of every character that could mean any kind of bond with the past 
in the case of organizations born with the beginning of political change.11 In 
the construction of the new Spanish political elite there is, then, a true 
generational gap, reflected in the Spanish MPs' extreme youth, and their 
absence of "personal" bonds with the Spanish political reality previous to 
democracy.12
  Once again, this pact of silence and oblivion is imposed,  resulting in, and this 
is the subject we are interested in, a scarce presence in the new Parliament of the 
Francoist Procuradores en Cortes (Table 1). The old representantives of the 
Francoist regime are not only not very meaningful in number, but also quickly 
disappear during the first legislature. This double discontinuity, both with the 
tradition of democratic life in Spain as well as with the Francoist past, is an 
important element that should be taken into account in the process of creating the 
democratic culture of the new political class.13
 The Parliament's institutionalizing process is also affected by the difficulties in 
the consolidation of the party system in Spain. As we see in the following pages, an 
important part of the parliamentary elite's renewal is due to huge changes 
taking place in party organizations during the 80's. Such an instability  made 
some authors  define the Spanish political system as "volatile parties and stable 
electors" (Barnes et al. 1986), and has affected almost every party with the 
exception of the PSOE. Although everything seems to point out that the great
centre-right party (PP) has obtained an important degree of consolidation in the
past years, at this very moment the situation has not yet definitively  crystallized
due to the continuous internal problems of the IU, the coalition situated to the left
of the Socialist Party.
There are two other elements that also have a clear effect on the decreasing
tendency in the Spanish parliamentary elite's stability during the period of time
under study. In the first place, the existence of Autonomous Comunities and the
resulting celebration of elections since 1980 add further complexity. There are still
no definite data to allow us to accurately draw the exchange rates between both
groups of parliamentarians, but some general tendencies can be described. At an
earlier stage, the introduction of the autonomous regime  no doubt meant the
"transfer" of some relevant members of the national Parliament to the autonomous
parliaments. This is easily perceived in the cases of the nationalist parties' main
leaders. But later on, the direction of this flow may have been reversed; that is, a
meaningful number of MPs have previous political experience as autonomous
parliamentarians.
Table 1. Presence of Francoist "procuradores" in the Cortes (Congress and Senate).
1. Constituent Legislature (1977-1979)
Number of legislatures* UCD AP** PSO
E
Others Royal Sen. Total
1 21 3 - 3 2  29
2 17 4 - - 4 25
 3 5 - - 1 4 10
4 1 3 - - 2 6
5 or more - 3 - - 4 7
Total 44 13 - 4 16 77
% of group 16.3 72.2 0.0 4.0 39.02 -
% of total Cortes - - - - -  12.9
2. First Legislature (1979-1982)
Number of legislatures UCD AP PSOE Others Total
1 17 1 - 2 20
2 11 1 - - 12
3 5 1 - - 6
4 3 1 - - 4
5 - 3 - 1 4
Total 36 7 - 3 46
% of group 12.5 50.0 - 3.7 -
% of total Cortes - - - -  8.6
* Number of legislatures in which the member of Parliament or Senator was "procurador"in the
Francoist Cortes.
** The figures corresponding to the AP for the first legislature are approximate, due to this
organization lacking a parliamentary group in the Senate.
Source: Morán (1989).
In the Spanish case there is also another feature that should be take into 
account, as it also has an effect on the consideration of the problem of the MPs' 
change and stability.  Unlike other European countries, the application of the "ley 
de incompatibilidades" for high offices of the administration (in effect since 
January 1985) also directly affects parliamentarians. As a consequence, being a 
member of Congress or the Senate is considered to be incompatible with not only 
any other representative office at a local or autonomous level, but also with 
holding high offices in the Administration. The only exceptions are members of the 
country's Government, and the possible private professional activities undertaken 
by members of the Congress and Senate.14
The development of the "Estado de las Autonomías" as well as membership of 
the European Community are two elements that further complicate the 
Spanish Parliament's rapid institutionalization, in what is referred to as the 
stability of its components.
Leaving aside the particularities mentioned up to now, one of the main
theses I support here is that the study of the parliamentary class's characteristics
and, above all, its "dynamic" dimension, is decisive in the analysis of the Spanish
political parties' nature and functions. It is in this sense in which I am convinced
that an analysis of this kind not only affects the study of the Parliament's
institutionalization but also refers to the examination of the political parties'
institutionalization process, putting forward some conclusions on the way in which
"political careers" are designed inside these organizations.
My arguments are based, mainly, on two claims. First, the political parties 
appear as the main, or almost the only, elements on which Spaniards' political 
participation is vertebrated. The absence of a democratic tradition of 
associationism, together with the parties' tendency to obstruct the development of 
alternative channels for participation in political life, turns them into true 
"monopolizers" of Spanish political life. Nevertheless, this situation of hegemony 
created, in a sense, by the political elite's certainty that it was necessary to 
channel the high degree of mobilizations of the late seventies, occurred in a 
situation of weakness of the political parties - a weakness made evident not only 
by the difficulties in the consolidation of the party system, but also by the low 
rates of party membership and feelings of partisan identification.15
  On the other side, electoral law bestowes upon them a hegemonic role in the 
selection of candidates running for the Congress. The election of members of
Congress is made through closed and blocked lists based on a system of corrected 
proportional representation (the D'Hondt formula).16 
Consequently, the key moment in which the Parliament's composition is decided 
upon is not so much the election itself but the drawing up of the candidates' 
list made in each party's electoral committee appointed by its leading organ. The 
design of every electoral list for the different constituencies, then, turns into a 
struggle between the party's rank and file, its local and regional federations and 
the power of its central leadership. In this way, the renewal of the 
Parliament's composition reflects not only the problems of the party system's 
structure but also its own internal divisions, the power relations between their 
different factions, and the degree of autonomy of the different federations. Thus it 
offers key information on the institutionalization rate of the parties as 
organizations, as well as the weight of leadership in them. We cannot forget 
that the construction process of the party organizations was, in all cases, 
characterized by the resilience of the old organizational formulas based on the 
exaltation of hierarchies, discipline and party unity. In the case of parties with a 
long historical tradition (the PSOE and the PCE), adaptation to the new 
democratic context above all meant the need to rapidly become mass parties with a 
large rank and file membership, to extend their organizational structure at the 
national level, and to proceed with certain ideological transformations (the most 
significant changes were giving up Marxism and the acceptance of the monarchy), 
as well as embracing some new political demands (feminism, environmentalism, 
etc.). But even so, the process took place maintaining the previous organizational 
formulas.
The process is more complicated for the new center and rightist parties, as
the difficulties of establishing a strong organizational structure persisted
throughout the 1980s. In any case, the successful model (that of the PP) also fits
into this old model of the hierarchical party, ruled by just one center and by a 
small leadership elite.17 Within this framework the possibilities of getting 
to Parliament for those people with critical positions or, simply, peripheral 
positions, with respect to the parties' leadership groups, were minimal.
Analysis of Results
In  my previous article (Morán 1989), I put forward a series of provisional
conclusions, some of which have been corroborated by the data gathered in
subsequent  legislatures. The main ideas that are still in force can be very briefly
outlined.
In spite of Francoism meaning a very harsh interruption of parliamentary 
careers, it cannot be stated that we have a political class lacking any kind of 
experience in Chambers of a representative nature. There is a relative presence of 
Procuradores of the Francoist Cortes, gathered in the center-right parties. 
Nevertheless, this presence is limited and, above all, very short, as it is practically 
non existent in the Second Legislature. The electoral  setback endured by the UCD 
(Unión de Centro Democrático) is the main reason for this disappearance.18
 The key moment that should be taken into consideration is the beginning of the 
IInd. Legislature after the October 1982 elections. Three basic facts define this 
moment: (a) The UCD crisis (it loses 157 members in the Congress, and has no
parliamentary group in the Senate); (b) The beginning of the consolidation of a 
new party on the right wing: the AP, that after years of huge internal problems 
gives way to the appearance of the PP, and finally (c) the PSOE's electoral victory. 
This huge electoral turnover has, as a consequence, the abrupt end of the careers 
of a considerable number of the UCD's parliamentarians. Of the 168 that the UCD 
had, only 47 continue their parliamentary careers as members of Congress for 
other parties.19
 Data relative to the parliamentarians' survival in both Chambers 
(Congress and Senate) up to the IIIrd. Legislature show high renewal rates, 
although with a certain decreasing tendency after the 1986 elections. Between 
1977 and 1986, when compared to members of Congress, there are more Senators 
without any experience before the beginning of every new legislature (Morán 1989: 
79). Two facts may explain this remarkable difference. First, Senators' election 
through a variant of a plurality system has, as a consequence, the weight of the 
Senate's candidates being  more relevant than that of the members of Congress. 
The parties tend to offer as candidates "notables" with prestige within the electoral 
constituencies. Thus, the "standard" type of Senator is rather different from that of 
the member of Congress: being rather older and having a professional life apart 
from his parliamentary career. This significantly decreases the Senators' degree of 
professionalization, and above all weakens their inclusion in the parties' life and 
their dependance on their organizational structures.20 
On the other hand, since the beginning the Senate was conceived as a 
Chamber closely linked with the autonomies. Thus, we may find a larger 
flow of senators giving up their parliamentary careers to attach themselves 
to different aspects of the autonomies'
political life.
The PSOE is the only party not to suffer important internal breaches during 
the first legislative term. On the other hand, being a long existent party increases 
the chances of developing much longer interparty political careers than in other 
political organizations. This is only partly true due to the influence of two facts. 
First of all, breaking with the old party organization meant the arrival of a very 
young party elite, only one year before Franco's death. And, secondly, it must not 
be forgotten that the number of socialist  militants was very small at the 
beginning of the political transition. The massive affiliation to political parties 
(albeit in the Spanish context) took place in the months immediately prior to the 
first elections in 1977, and it is only from this moment that the majority of 
political careers are built within the parties.21
 Examination of the data referring to the two last legislatures allows us to 
insist on some of these tendencies and, thus, present new conclusions. Following 
the 1983 socialist electoral victory, the party system seems to definitely crystallize. 
This does not mean that some parties' problems of autodefinition and internal 
leadership have been totally overcome, but it does mean that apart from the CDS's 
disappearance from the political scene during the early 1990s, there are no 
dramatic breakages as there were previously. This enables us to consider the 
parliamentarians' permanency and renewal rates in firmer terms, taking into 
consideration the impact of electoral results and their translation into seats.
(Tables 2 and 3.)
Table 2. General Elections 1977-1993. Distribution of Seats in the Congress of Deputies.
15 June
1977
Constituent
Legislature
1 March
1979
Ist. Leg.
28 Oct.
1982
IInd. Leg.
22 June 1986
IIIrd. Leg.
29 Oct.
1989
IVth. Leg.
6 June
1993
Vth. Leg.
PSOE 118 121 202 184 176 159
PP 16 9 106 105 106 141
UCD 166 168 12 - - -
IU (PCE) 20 23 4 7 17 18
CiU 11 8 12 18 18 17
PNV 8 7 8 6 5 5
CDS - - 2 19 14 -
Others 11 14 4 11 14 10
Total 350 350 350 350 350 350
Table 3. General Elections 1977-1993. Distribution (in %) of Seats in the Congress of
Deputies.
15 June
1977 
Constituent
Legislature
1 March
1979
Ist. Leg.
28 Oct.
1982
IInd. Leg.
22 June
1986
IIIrd. Leg.
29 Oct.
1989
IVth. Leg.
6 June
1993
Vth. Leg.
PSOE 33.7 34.6 57.7 52.7 50.3 45.4
PP 4.6 2.6 30.3 30.0 30.3 40.3
UCD 47.4 48.0 3.4 - - -
IU (PCE) 5.7 6.6 1.1 2.0 4.9 5.1
CiU 3.1 2.3 3.4 5.1 5.1 4.9
PNV 2.3 2.0 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.4
CDS - - 0.6 5.4 4.0 -
Others 3.2 3.9 1.2 3.1 4.0 2.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 4. Number of Legislatures of Permanency of Each Member of Parliament by Party
Affiliation Over the Total of the Members of the Congress of Deputies in Different
Legislatures.
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
PSOE
%
226
46.9
110
22.8
56
11.6
48
10.0
23
4.8
19
3.9
482
100
PP
%
192
64.0
65
21.7
28
9.3
13
4.3
0
0.0
2
0.7
300
100
UCD
%
123
51.7
78
32.8
21
8.8
13
5.5
2
0.8
1
0.4
238
100
CDS
%
13
54.2
10
41.7
0
0.0
0
0.0
1
4.2
0
0.0
24
100
IU/PCE
%
23
45.1
20
39.2
6
11.8
2
3.9
0
0.0
0
0.0
51
100
PNV
%
15
51.8
7
24.1
7
24.1
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
29
100
CiU
%
18
40.9
8
18.2
13
29.5
3
6.8
1
2.3
1
2.3
44
100
Others
%
34
64.1
15
28.3
3
5.7
1
1.9
0
0.0
0
0.0
53
100
Total
%
644
52.1
313
25.6
134
11.0
80
6.6
27
2.2
23
1.9
1221
100
Source: Figures brought up to date by September 1994, with data supplied by the Archive of the
Congress of Deputies.
If the data referring to the number of legislatures of permanency of the total
universe of members of Congress are taken into consideration, the most
remarkable fact is the existence of a high rate of renewal (Table 4). Slightly more
than half of the total of the 1221 (52.7%) that have been members of Congress
throughout the six legislatures remain in the Chamber during just one legislative
term. The problems of constructing a stable party system, together with the other
complexities of building a democratic political system in Spain, result in the fact
that only twenty three members of Congress survive in the Chamber from the
constituent legislature. Nineteen of them belong to the PSOE.  Furthermore, the 
parliamentarians' permanency in four or five legislatures is also very rare.22
 If we only analyze the parliamentary experience of members of Congress for the 
last legislature, since the general elections of June 1993 (Table 5), the same 
pattern of discontinuity is confirmed, or put in other words, the limited 
"experience" in  parliamentary life. More than a third of the representatives have 
no previous parliamentary experience, a higher amount than would be expected 
from the electoral results. For instance, the PSOE loses 17 seats compared to the 
1989 elections and so, if the renewal tendency was either small or none, it would 
not have to have "newcomer" members within its ranks, but nearly a fourth of its 
159 members (24.2%) obtain for the first time a parliamentary mandate at a 
national level.23 The renewal increase in the PP and IU cases is surely a 
consequence, in part, of the growth of their electoral support and of the greater 
number of members of Congress they obtain. Finally, we can also conclude that 
the "historical" nucleus (as it is referred to in parliamentary practice) consists of 
a small number of socialist and popular members. The IU's obvious break with 
its old leaders, and the huge renewal taking place inside the coalition, is 
translated into the fact that none of the fifth legislature's members of Congress 
had been parliamentarians before 1986.
The differences between parties can be explained not only through their
institutionalization problems as organizations, but also by deeper problems of
ideological definition and, in consequence, by dramatic changes in their
leaderships. And so we need to take into consideration the permanency indicator of
the members according to their political affiliation.
Table 5. Number of Legislatures of the Members of Congress of the Fifth
Legislature (1993) by Party Affiliation in the Congress of Deputies (in %)
Number of Legislatures PSOE PP IU Others Total
1 24.2 39.3 44.4 40.3 32.6
2 18.9 31.1 38.9 34.7 25.7
3 19.2 9.4 16.7 19.1 17.6
4 21.7 9.4 0.0 2.7 14.1
5 8.2 3.7 0.0 1.0 5.4
6 7.6 1.6 0.0 2.1 4.6
Total of Deputies 159 141 18 42 350
Source: Gangas (1994)
The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) is, no doubt, the political
organization with the highest degree of stability since the beginning of the political
transition. Throughout this period, it has gradually turned into an organization
fulfilling every requirement for its full institutionalization. Despite the existence of
a significant internal debate,  especially in reference to the relationship between
party and government and the orientation of government policies, it has always
relied on a steady nucleus of leaders. On the other hand, breaches within the party
have been very rare,24<A HREF="#FT24">(24)</A><A NAME="TX24"> </A>and
the leadership's weight in the selection of candidates for the Congress has been
very significant. Every relevant socialist leader at a national level is or has been a
member of Congress, enabling us to state that a political career's culmination
within the organization is obtained by entrance into this Chamber. Only the
socialist autonomous political elite leaves Congress during the 80's to become part 
of the autonomous parliaments and governments. Finally, it should be pointed out 
that the party's leadership has always tended to present as candidates people 
closely linked with the party's organizational structures. This tendency has been 
broken for just two reasons: in the last elections, some independents were included 
in the lists, to try to stop the strong electoral decrease forecast by every poll.25 
And secondly, some high ex-officials of the Administration and members 
of the Government have been rewarded with secure  positions in the candidates' 
lists.
These practices can be translated into an obvious fact: the socialist 
parliamentarians have the highest rates of permanency inside the Congress, with 
a continuous decrease in the level of renewal (Table 6). Thus, the socialist group 
has a very consistent nucleus that is decisive in the Chamber's 
institutionalization. On the other hand, there are data on the socialist members' 
experience in representative offices that confirm this tendency (Table 7). It seems 
that throughout these last years, a clear pattern of political career has been 
created within the organization, in which having been a representative at a 
regional nevel seems to be an important preliminary step to entering the national 
Parliament.26
Table 6. Previous Political Experience in Representative Offices (in %). PSOE
(1977-1993).
Offices 1979 1982 1989 1993 Total
Local 2.4 24.5 12.1 14.4 13.8
Provincial 8.5 9.8 6.0 11.0 8.8
Regional 8.5 65.7 80.5 63.7 73.5
National 1.2 0.0 1.3 10.3 3.8
European 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2
Source: Gangas (1994)
Table 7. Permanency in Different Legislatures of the Congress of Deputies. PSOE
(1977-1993)
Legislature A B C D E F G
Constituent 118 - - - - - -
Ist. 121 +4 79 56.8 60 43.2 139
IInd. 202 +87 94 41.6 132 58.4 226
IIIrd. 184 -18 141 68.8 64 31.2 205
IVth. 176 -8 135 75.0 45 25.0 180
Vth. 159 -17 120 72.7 45 27.3 165
A: Number of members of Congress in the parliamentary group.
B: Increase or decrease regarding previous legislatures.
C: Number of members of Congress that maintain their seats with respect to the previous
legislature.
D: % of members of Congress that maintain their seat with respect to the total of the
parliamentary group during the legislature.
E: Number of new members of Congress with respect to the previous legislature.
F: % of new members of Congress with respect to the total of the group during the legislature.
G: Total of members of Congress throughout the legislature also including those who did not
finish the term and those who were included after its beginning.(C+E=F)
Source: Figures brought up to date by September 1994, with data supplied by the Archive of the
Congress of Deputies.
The interpretation of the  current PP's case is rather more complex, due to its
huge consolidation problems as the right wing party. These problems have
resulted, at the ideological level, in an unremitting effort to establish the basis for
a center-right ideology and to present an alternative political programme to that of
the long lasting socialist government. The PP has also tried to clearly mark their
complete break with the Francoist past. This has meant, at the organizational
level, the party's reconstruction from the basis established by the Alianza Popular
(AP), including within it some of the small organizations that were part of the
UCD. Finally, from the leadership's point of view, these problems have resulted in
the wide renewal of the party's leadership nucleus  that has also been presented as
a "generation rupture".
In this situation it is difficult to expect a high stability in the PP members of
Congress (Table 8). However, what is perceivable is a certain evolution towards
greater permanency, once the aforementioned organizational problems have been
solved. The PP is also a highly centralized party, in which all its main national
leaders are also members of Congress. On the other hand, the transfer flow of
members of Congress towards representative organs or autonomous governments
is probably lower due to the fact that the PP has taken part in  autonomous
governments in very few autonomous communities. Its increased electoral weight
in the 1995 autonomous elections has probably modified this fact.
Table 8. Permanency in Different Legislatures of the Congress of Deputies. PP
(1977-1993)
Legislature A B C D E F G
Constituent 16 - - - 16 100 -
Ist. 9* - - - - - -
IInd. 106 +97 16 14.8 92 85.2 108
IIIrd. 105 -1 54 47.4 60 52.6 114
IVth. 106 +1 55 47.0 62 53.0 117
Vth. 141 +35 81 56.2 62 43.3 143
A: Number of members of Congress in the parliamentary group.
B: Increase or decrease regarding previous legislatures.
C: Number of members of Congress that maintain their seats with respect to the previous
legislature.
D: % of members of Congress that maintain their seat with respect to the total of the
parliamentary group during the legislature.
E: Number of new members of Congress with respect to the previous legislature.
F: % of new members of Congress with respect to the total of the group during the legislature.
G: Total of members of Congress throughout the legislature also including those who did not
finish the term and those who were included after its beginning.(C+E=F)
* Some members' change of parliamentary group makes results unreliable; thus they are not
included.
Source: Figures brought up to date by 15/9/94, with data supplied by the Archive of the Congress
of Deputies.
The case of the IU's27 parliamentarians is rather similar to that of 
the PP, despite both parties being located on opposite extremes of the 
parliament's ideological continuum. The high renewal of this coalition's 
members of Congress (Table 8) reflects the enormous internal difficulties 
arising from converting the former communist party into a new and reformed left 
wing pary. In this case, the internal breakages inside the party have been very 
serious, and proof of this is the fact that no communist member of the Congress 
has remained in the Chamber since the first legislature. Moreover, it is highly 
significant that the 1982 elections meant the greatest electoral crisis endured 
by the party, as well as a complete renewal of its members of Congress. Efforts to 
build up a coalition uniting other left wing groups and political personalities 
apart from the PSOE, and to create a true leadership within the coalition, seem 
to have created a certain parliamentary nucleus, especially from the IIIrd. 
legislature onwards. Like other parties, there is a relation between holding 
relevant offices within the organization and obtaining a seat in Congress.
- ¡Error!Marcador no definido. -
Disagreements between IU parliamentarians seem to be more notable, or at least 
more noticeable to public opinion, than with other political parties, and so no 
definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding its parliamentarians' renewal and 
permanency patterns.28
 Lastly, I have taken into consideration the cases of the two nationalist 
parties with a stronger and more stable presence in Congress, as they both support 
the thesis of a progression in the full institutionalization of the Spanish 
Parliament, at least regarding their internal composition. The Catalonian 
nationalist coalition's, Convergencia i Unio (CiU), case is especially relevant as it 
presents the highest permanency rates in its parliamentarians, at least in the two 
past legislatures (Table 10). CiU seems to have created a group of members 
"specializing" in parliamentary duties at a national level that has turned out to be 
of extreme importance during the last legislature, with the continuity of the 
socialist government depending on its support in the Chamber. In fact, one of its 
members is part of the small group of "survivors" from the the constituent 
legislature.29 In the case of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) (Table 11), 
which has always had a smaller number of members of Congress, it can be 
concluded that their level of permanency in the Chamber is rather lower 
than the CiU's. For instance, in the Vth. legislature,  in spite of obtaining the 
same number of seats, 60% of members had no previous parliamentary 
experience.  Nonetheless, the number is too small (although very important 
politically) to make these percentages significant.
These results confirm the provisional conclusions I put forward some years
ago:  the Spanish Parliament then heading towards its institutionalization seems
to have progressed in this direction.  Some of the  obstacles found throughout the
process seem to have already been overcome, mainly those owing to the weakness
of the party system during the first decade of democratic life. On the other hand,
everything seems to indicate that the "parliamentary elite" holds a central position
in Spanish political life, as it remains the ultimate arena of the majority of careers
born within the political parties.  The primacy of party organizations in Spanish
political life, as well as their monopolization of parliamentary elections, supports
my assessment that the study of the Congress' composition is an indispensable
element of understanding the dynamics of the party system's construction, as well
as its institutionalization process.
Nevertheless, there still are some dark spots that require further study. I
will point out only two of the more significant ones: first, to study the negotiating
process between the different party levels from which the electoral lists are
created; second, to follow "the track" of those members who do not renew their seat
in Congress. This is the only way to obtain a clearer map of the different kinds of
political careers generated within each party, and to generate a subsequent
analysis of their "organizational cultures".
Table 9. Permanency in Different Legislatures of the Congress of Deputies. IU
(1977-1993)
Legislature A B C D E F G
Constituent 20 - - - 23 100 -
Ist. 23 +3 20 76.9 6 23.1 26
IInd. 4 -19 4 100 - - 4
IIIrd. 7 +3 3 42.9 4 57.1 7
IVth. 17 +10 6 30.0 14 70.0 20
Vth. 18 +1 13 65.0 7 35.0 20
A: Number of members of Congress in the parliamentary group.
B: Increase or decrease regarding previous legislatures.
C: Number of members of Congress that maintain their seats with respect to the previous
legislature.
D: % of members of Congress that maintain their seat with respect to the total of the
parliamentary group during the legislature.
E: Number of new members of Congress with respect to the previous legislature.
F: % of new members of Congress with respect to the total of the group during the legislature.
G: Total of members of Congress throughout the legislature also including those who did not
finish the term and those who were included after its beginning.(C+E=F)
Source: Figures brought up to date by September 1994, with data supplied by the Archive of the
Congress of Deputies.
Table 10.   Permanency in Different Legislatures of the Congress of Deputies. CiU
(1977-1993)
Legislature A B C D E F G
Constituent 11* - - - - - -
Ist. 8 -3 4 36.4 7 63.6 11
IInd. 12 +4 6 46.2 7 53.8 13
IIIrd. 18 +6 9 40.9 13 59.1 22
IVth. 18 0 19 95.0 1 5.0 20
Vth. 17 -1 12 70.6 5 29.4 17
A: Number of members of Congress in the parliamentary group.
B: Increase or decrease regarding previous legislatures.
C: Number of members of Congress that maintain their seats with respect to the previous
legislature.
D: % of members of Congress that maintain their seat with respect to the total of the
parliamentary group during the legislature.
E: Number of new members of Congress with respect to the previous legislature.
F: % of new members of Congress with respect to the total of the group during the legislature.
G: Total of members of Congress throughout the legislature also including those who did not
finish the term and those who were included after its beginning.(C+E=F)
Source: Figures brought up to date by September 1994, with data supplied by the Archive of the
Congress of Deputies.
Table 11.   Permanency in Different Legislatures of the Congress of Deputies. PNV
(1977-1993)
Legislature A B C D E F G
Constituent 8 - - - - - -
Ist. 7 -1 6 66.7 3 33.3 9
IInd. 8 +1 3 30.0 7 70.0 10
IIIrd. 6 -2 4 50.0 4 50.0 8
IVth. 5 -1 5 55.6 4 44.4 9
Vth. 5 0 2 40.0 3 60.0 5
A: Number of members of Congress in the parliamentary group.
B: Increase or decrease regarding previous legislatures.
C: Number of members of Congress that maintain their seats with respect to the previous
legislature.
D: % of members of Congress that maintain their seat with respect to the total of the
parliamentary group during the legislature.
E: Number of new members of Congress with respect to the previous legislature.
F: % of new members of Congress with respect to the total of the group during the legislature.
G: Total of members of Congress throughout the legislature also including those who did not
finish the term and those who were included after its beginning.(C+E=F)
Source: Figures brought up to date by September 1994, with data supplied by the Archive of the
Congress of Deputies.
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FOOTNOTES
Nonetheless there is a tradition to these kinds of studies, begun by 
J.J.Linz's research of the Francoist political elite. See Linz (1974) and Jerez 
(1982). On the other hand, this line of work is much more developed in 
research on the Spanish bureaucratic elite: Beltrán (1977); Baena del Alcázar 
(1979, 1983 and 1984).
The majority of works on the Spaniard's political culture have been based on 
the enlargement of the classical scheme by Almond and Verba. For an attempt 
to surpass such a perspective, see Morán and Benedicto (1995).
Von Beyme's work (1995) is especially relevant for his combination of 
theoretical reflection on the concept of political class and the specific analysis of 
some of its more relevant characteristics and transformations in comtemporary 
societies. Therefore Von Beyme's is an alternative model that underscores the 
relevance of the "political class" as a study group.
 This is not the place to explain in detail the debate over the transformations in 
political life and in democratic systems that have been, during the last decades, 
the central focus for many social scentists. It will be sufficient to point out that 
apart from the assessment of the constitution of a party state (Von Beyme 
1995), we should also take into consideration the thesis of the crisis of the 
traditional political parties and the emergence of new political actors that could 
affect the nature and functions of the traditional institutions of political 
representation and the "places" for political decision making (Schmitter 
and Lehmbruch 1979; Offe 1988).
 I am not going to enter debates on the definition of political class and 
the members of parliament's position within it. Sartori provices a pragmatic 
definition that allows us to overcome difficulties and apply it in our study: 
"Classe politica è dunque una sottospecie della classe dirigente: quella parte 
della classe dirigente che si occupa dell'essercizio del potere" (Sartori 1963: 281).
 Some of the main studies on political transitions are Maravall (1982), 
Cotarelo et al. (1992), Tezanos et al.(1989) and O'Donnell et al. (1986). 
Although it is necessary to admit that the role
of the political elites in the process of political change is especially relevant for the 
Spanish case, the predominant tendency in most of the studies has usually 
lessened the complexity of the process to a match (or game of chess) between such 
elites - a game that resulted in the success of consensus. For an interesting 
criticism of what the author calls the "pact school" and for an alternative proposal 
of study, see Edle (1995).
 The literature on the party system in Spain is very large; Montero and 
Pallarés (1992) present a useful review of it.
 At the beginning of each legislative term, each senator or member of the 
Congress must fill out a form with some basic biographical data, but it is not 
compulsory to complete them all, and consequently the information they give out 
is uneven. Up to now the only general study that has been published on the MPs 
of the two first legislative terms (based on these data) have been the works by 
Díaz Nosty (1979 and 1981). The recent passing of a norm by which all 
members of parliament must make a statement of their properties at the 
beginning of each legislative term, may mean a positive step towards 
increasing the information available.
 There are only some isolated cases (five in total), such as that of Dolores 
Ibarruri (La Pasionaria) or José Prat, that run in the constituent election as 
symbols of a bond with republican Spain. But their presence was merely 
testimonial and their weight in parliamentary life practically none.
 On this issue, see the excellent work of Aguilar (1995 and 1996); the 
latter contains a detailed analysis of the influence of historical memory on the 
mobilizations that took place at the end of the 1970's.
 This breaking with the past is a common element in all Spanish political parties. 
In the PSOE's case, this was done in the Suresnes Congress in 1974, in which a 
new generation of leaders took over from the old socialist leaders in exile. This 
was paralleled in the PCE's case by the abandonment of the "communist 
orthodoxy", although it seems that the definition problems of "the new party of 
the left" have not yet been solved. Finally, we must point out that the difficulties 
of consolidation of a large centre-right party in Spain have been closely linked to 
this demand for "generation change" in the party elite.
 Thus, in Spanish political life there is a genuine "generation" gap that 
obliterates from it not only those that took direct part in the civil war, but also 
those that went through it during their childhood. For the most part, the new 
"political class" is born after the end of the conflict. The most eminent exceptions 
to this rule are Manuel Fraga and Santiago Carrillo.
Although twenty years have gone by, Carrillo's active role during the 
transition still generates some significant commentaries: "It's none of my business, 
but the provocation consisted not only in the legalization of the Communist Party, 
but in allowing Carrillo to keep leading it. It is not that I have anything against 
Carrillo, but we all had made a great effort to forget the past, all of us, except 
communists". (Interview with Miguel Primo de Rivera, El País, Memoria de la 
Transición 6, November 1995.)
 Curiously, whilst these data make it hard to believe in the validity of 
applying the idea of an "historical memory" that would allow for a rapid 
reconstruction of the elite's political culture, this very same thesis has been used 
to explain the generation of the Spaniard's new political culture and to justify, 
in part, the "gentleness" and success of the political transition (Maravall 1982).
 Being a member of the European Parliament is also incompatible with a 
seat in the Congress or the Senate.
 Party membership rates in Spain are extremely low when compared to 
those in most of the European countries, and the same applies to union 
membership. On this matter, see Montero (1981) and Del Castillo (1990). In recent 
years there has been a significant change in Spaniards' political participation. 
This change has not affected the traditional political organizations, but has 
meant a considerable increase in the affiliation and participation in "non 
conventional organizations" (NGOs, etc.). See Adell (1993, 1994) and Alonso 
(1994).
In the Senate's case this is done differently, as in each electoral constituency 
Senators are elected by the direct vote to each candidate with an 
absolute majority system.
On the consequences of these "organizational cultures" for Spanish political 
life, see Álvarez Junco (1994)
and Morán (1996).
 This pattern is totally comparable to the Italian case. Cotta (1979) 
points out that the members of Congress with parliamentary experience 
during fascism represented 15% of the Constituent Assembly, a figure 
decreasing to 3% in the first legislature and non existent in the third. The 
German case, again, follows the same pattern.
Most centrist members of Congress that obtained, once again, a seat, did so 
inside the AP, or in one of the coalitions formed around this party before it 
became the PP. A small group of social-democrats joined the PSOE during the 
first legislative term, and only four of them reappear later as members of the 
CDS, the party headed by the former centrist President of the Government, 
Adolfo Suárez. In any case, the majority of the parliamentary careers of the 
centrist ex-MPs were very short.
 There is, nevertheless, a possibility that these differences between members 
of Congress and those of the Senate may be diminished. The data provided 
by Von Beyme (1995) on the levelling of significant distinctions regarding 
the social background, education levels and ways of life of members of 
parliament, as well as the spreading of a "professional-general" of politics seem 
to point in this direction, although they refer to the German case.
This does not mean that there was a total lack of previous "political 
experience" in the leadership groups and in the new members of parliament. 
This subject has not been widely studied, but we must point out that for the 
cases of the two largest leftist parties (PSOE and PCE), there is a considerable 
number of leaders and members of parliament coming from three different 
arenas: from the parties of the extreme left (LC, LCR, MC, ORT etc.) after their 
electoral setback of 1977, from the leadership groups of the most active social 
movements in the last years of the dictatorship (neighborhood 
associations, feminist organizations etc.) and, to a lesser degree, from the 
unions.
 Once again, Von Beyme's recent study (1995) supplies useful information on 
the German case, and allows for a certain comparison. "The average permanence 
in Parliament is of a little more than nine years, with a tendency to extend...
[The re-election percentage] is of approximately 80% for one re-election. Two 
thirds of the members of Parliament
have been re-elected twice, half of them thrice and there is 30% that have been re-
elected, at least, four times" (Von Beyme 1995: 130).
There is the possibility of some of them coming from the Senate or from some 
of the regional Parliaments, thus questioning the idea of the existence of a 
continous but moderate renewal of the parliamentary staff. I do not have the 
data to allow the verification of this thesis in the autonomous Parliaments' 
case. On the other hand, until 1989 the number of Senators that "changed" one 
Chamber for another was very small, and nothing seems to suggest that this 
tendency has changed (Morán 1989: 84).
 In all these years just one member of Congress for the PSOE has obtained a 
seat for another party, the IU.
 In the case of the two most significant independent candidates included in the 
PSOE's lists, the results were disastrous. Both judges (B. Garzón and V. Pérez 
Mariño) left their seats within a short space of time, creating a considerable 
scandal by their open criticism of the government's policy towards the 
corruption issues that have affected it during recent years.
Data supplied by Gangas (1994) are, nevertheless, difficult to interpret as 
there is no specification of what kind of offices are being referred to. It also 
introduces a certain confusion between offices of representation within the party 
and in other representative institutions in the different levels it takes into 
consideration.
 I include in this group the former MPs for the Partido Comunista de España 
(PCE), the main party in the coalition, as well as those belonging to the Partit 
Socialiste Unificat Catalunya.
 No work has yet been published on the IU that analyzes exhaustively 
the particular formation of the coalition and the hegemonic weight of the PCE 
within it. Most works are limited to the study of the PCE during the transition 
period. See Montero and Pallarés (1992).
 This MP, Miguel Roca, still a member of the Congress when this paper was 
first written, gave up his seat to become the CiU's candidate for mayor of 
Barcelona in the local elections of 1995.
